Disqualifying Federal Judges for Bias: A
Consideration of the Extrajudicial Bias Limitation for
Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)
INTRODUCTION

It has long been recognized that the success of the judiciary
depends, fundamentally, on public confidence in the judicial system.1 That confidence necessarily depends upon public confidence in the impartiality of the judges who implement that
system. 2 Indeed, it was the desire to foster public confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary that motivated Congress, in 1974, to
enlarge and clarify the standards for judicial disqualification law.
As we approach the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of
the amended 28 U.S.C. § 455,4 most commentators agree that
while the standards for judicial disqualification have been textually
broadened, they are anything but "clear" and that, consequently,
public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process is
threatened.5
1 See THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, Book III, § 405(a), at 84 (Allan Bloom trans., 1968)
("When licentiousness and illness multiply in a city, aren't many courts and hospitals
opened, and aren't the arts of the law court and medicine full of pride when even
many free men take them very seriously?") (comment of Socrates to Glaucon).
The above quote ought not to be read as a categorical endorsement of the judicial system, however, as the comment was made only to suggest "how much finer and
better it is to arrange [one's life] so as to have no need of a dozing judge." Id.
§ 405(c).
2 See Randall J. Litteneker, Comment, Disqualification of FederalJudges for Bias or
Prejudice,46 U. CHI. L. REv. 236, 267 (1978) (recognizing "the need for a judicial system that not only is impartial in fact, but also appearsto render disinterested justice").
3 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988). Section 455 of the United States Code, the general
judicial disqualification provision, was amended in 1974. Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-512, § 1, 88 Stat. 1609. The fundamental purpose behind the section's amendment was to "broaden and clarify the grounds for judicial disqualification" in order
"to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process." H.R. REP.
No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6351, 6355
[hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
4 December 5, 1994 will mark the 20th anniversary of the adoption of amended
§ 455.
5 See Seth E. Bloom,JudicialBias and FinancialInterest as GroundsforDisqualification
of FederalJudges, 35 CASE W. RES. L. Rnv. 662, 663 (1985) (stating that modern judicial
disqualification law is deficient because its formalistic and rigid approach to disqualification often fails to accommodate the somewhat conflicting interests of ensuring judicial impartiality on the one hand, and maintaining judicial efficiency on the other).
See generally Edward G. Burg, Comment, Meeting the Challenge: RethinkingJudicialDisqualification, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1445, 1481-82 (1981) (arguing that the law of judicial
disqualification is unsettled and proposing a test for disqualification which would con-
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Part I of this Comment provides a general overview of the
modern framework of federal judicial disqualification law and introduces the concept of the extrajudicial source doctrine.6 Part II
addresses § 455's history and the congressional purposes behind
the 1974 amendment. Part III demonstrates the approaches various circuits have taken to incorporate the extrajudicial source doctrine into a § 455(a) analysis. Part IV discusses the contrary
position of the First Circuit that judicial bias can be disqualifying
under § 455(a). Part V addresses what appears to be particular
confusion within the Third Circuit regarding the applicability of
the extrajudicial source doctrine. Part VI discusses a case that the
United States Supreme Court recently decided upholding the extrajudicial source doctrine. Finally, Part VII offers further support
of why the extrajudicial source doctrine should be retained.
I.

MODERN STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION LAW: 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 AND 455

Sections 144 and 455 of the Judicial Code contain the heart of
judicial disqualification law.7 Section 144 sets out the procedural
centrate only on the reasonableness of a litigant's belief in the existence of bias);
Mark T. Coberly, Comment, Caesar's Wife Revisited-JudicialDisqualificationAfter the
1974 Amendments, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1201, 1201-02 (1977) (analyzing proposed
automatic disqualification procedures and concluding that the problems inherent in
such a system compel retention of the present statutory scheme); Susan B. Hoekema,
Comment, Questioning the Impartiality ofJudges: DisqualifyingFederalDistrict CourtJudges
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 60 TEMP. L.Q. 697, 697-98 (1987) (articulating concern that
federal judicial interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 455 has limited the intended broad
scope of the section by requiring an elevated standard of proof of bias and by restricting the situations where bias can be found); Litteneker, supra note 2 (suggesting that
the current judicial disqualification scheme is riddled with substantive and procedural
deficiencies and does not provide a total solution to the problems ofjudicial bias and
prejudice); Ellen M. Martin, Comment, Disqualificationof FederalJudgesfor Bias Under
28 US.C. Section 144 and Revised Section 455, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 139, 139-40 (1976)
(stating that congressional amendment to § 455 of title 28 of the United States Code
intending to broaden and clarify the grounds for disqualification has not achieved its
stated purpose and suggesting further congressional action).
6 Throughout this Comment, I will refer to the judicially created doctrine that
only extrajudicial bias warrants disqualification as the "extrajudicial bias limitation."
See Litteneker, supra note 2, at 254 (referring to the limitation that disqualifying bias
must be extrajudicial in nature as "the extrajudicial bias limitation").
7 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 (1988). A third provision exists which provides that "[n]o
judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by
him." 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1988). Section 47 appears to be designed to prevent a recently
promoted judge from hearing appeals from cases that the judge decided below. See
Burg, supra note 5, at 1448 & n.17 (noting that while § 47 applies only to circuit court
judges and not to Supreme Court Justices, the practice of Supreme Court Justices
presiding over cases that they heard below could be attacked under § 455(a)).
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
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requirements that must be complied with by a party seeking

recusals for bias or prejudice.9 Conversely, § 45510 is devoid of any
procedural requirements and enumerates the criteria
mandatory self-disqualification of all federal judges."
A.

for

Section 144

While § 14412 reads as if it is meant to be a peremptory approach to disqualification, a conclusion supported by the section's
legislative history, 3 the United States Supreme Court has long held
States Constitution likewise require disqualification where the appearance ofjustice is
not satisfied. U.S. CONsr. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . ."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No
State shall .. .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ...."); see, e.g., In reParr,13 B.R. 1010, 1019 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause will bar a trial where the appearance of'justice is not satisfied.") (citing In ReMurchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). The Parrcourt recognized
that the constitutional right is independent of §§ 144 and 455 but noted that "any bias
violative of Due Process 'would have more readily violated § 144 and § 455.'" Id.
(quoting United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 130 n.276 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en
banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977)). Accordingly, Supreme Court
rulings on judicial disqualification in the federal courts have generally interpreted the
Judicial Code and not the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution. Litteneker, supra
note 2, at 237 n.6 (citing Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921)).
8 While the terms "disqualification" and "recusal" differ in that disqualification
refers to statutorily mandated removal of ajudge and recusal to sua sponte removal by
the judge, this Comment will uniformly use the term "disqualification" for both
recusal and disqualification as the distinction is largely irrelevant today because
"[u]nder current statutes, disqualification is mandated in virtually all cases where
recusal is appropriate." Litteneker, supra note 2, at 237 n.5.
9 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988). The section is set out in its entirety infra at note 12.
10 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988). Section 455 is set out infra at note 29.
11 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988) with 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988).
12 Section 144 provides:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and
files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the
matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or
in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further
therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that
bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before
the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or
good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party
may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by
a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.
28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988).
13 See Coberly, supra note 5, at 1216 (citation omitted). This fact was illustrated by
an exchange between two congressmen debating the recusal statute. Id. at 1216
n.102. In this exchange, Representative Cullop of Indiana was asked by Representative Cox whether judges were allowed discretion in determining the sufficiency of
affidavits filed pursuant to § 144:
Mr. Cullop: . ..no, it provides that the judge shall proceed no
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that such a broad reading of the section is unwarranted. 4 In an
effort to avoid abuse and judge shopping, the Supreme Court, in
Berger v. United States,1" seized on the "legally sufficient" requirement of § 21 of the Judicial Code (the predecessor to § 144).16
The Berger Court determined that a judge was required to evaluate
18
the legal sufficiency, 7 but not the truth, of allegations of bias.
While the Berger mandate stipulated that an affidavit is legally
sufficient under § 144 when it gives "fair support" to a charge of
partiality, the standard has become more rigorous over the years as
courts have applied a "clear and convincing" standard 9 and now
evaluate whether the facts of an affidavit are sufficient to convince
further with the case. The filing of the affidavit deprives him ofjurisdiction in the case.
Mr. Cox: .

.

. Suppose the affidavit sets out certain reasons which

may exist in the mind of the party making the affidavit; suppose the
judge to whom the affidavit is submitted says that it is not a statutory
reason? In other words, does it not leave it to the discretion of the
judge?
Mr. Cullop: No; it expressly provides that the judge shall proceed
no further.
Id. (quotation omitted).
14 See Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 715 (D. Idaho 1981).
15 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
16 See Freeman, 507 F. Supp. at 715. The Berger Court declared that an affidavit
filed pursuant to § 21 "must give fair support to the charge of a bent mind that may
prevent or impede impartiality ofjudgment." Berger, 255 U.S. at 33-34.
17 Berger,255 U.S. at 36. Today, a three-part test has evolved to determine the legal
sufficiency of a § 144 motion which requires a party to demonstrate that: "1. The facts
are material and stated with particularity; 2. The facts are such that, if true they would
convince a reasonable person that a bias exists; [and] 3. The facts show that the bias is
personal, as opposed to judicial, in nature." United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532,
1540 (11 th Cir. 1987) (citing Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs, 524 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir.
1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976) (quotation omitted)); see also
United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 960 n.9 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946
(1987).
18 Berger,255 U.S. at 36. The Court understood that enabling the judge to pass on
the truth of the allegations would "give[ ) chance for the evil against which the section
is directed." Id.
The requirement that a judge may not pass on the truthfulness of the allegations
of a § 144 motion is absolute and requires the judge to assume that the facts of the
motion are true even where the judge knows that they are false. See Alabama, 828 F.2d
at 1540; United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
477 U.S. 908 (1986); United States v.Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1112 (7th Cir. 1976), affd
in part and vacated in part, 432 U.S. 137 (1977); In Re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d
381, 391 (1st Cir. 1961).
19 For a discussion of the clear and convincing standard now applied to § 144, see
Hoekema, supra note 5, at 706-07.
The author points out that a higher standard of proof is required under § 144
than § 455(a). Id. at 706. It is suggested that the higher standard of proof is necessary
to provide a counterbalance to the mandate under § 144 that ajudge accept all statements contained in the affidavit as true. Id.
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a reasonable person of the existence of bias. 20 The standard is also
difficult to meet because courts have determined that § 144's procedural requirements must be given a strict construction to protect
the judiciary from meritless attacks upon its integrity.2 In an effort
to avoid the abuses of such frivolous attacks, courts have determined that even the slightest infraction of any of § 144's procedural rules will usually result in a refusal to disqualify. 2
A final condition of § 144 that makes disqualification difficult
is the requirement that ajudge's alleged judicial bias must be "personal." 21 While a considerable amount of caselaw and commentary
has been devoted to the meaning of the term,2 4 personal bias is
essentially bias derived from an extrajudicial source. 25 The extraju20 Chitimacha Tribe v. Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157, 1165 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983); see also Balistrieri,779 F.2d at 1199 ("An affidavit is sufficient [under § 144] if it avers facts that, if true, would convince a reasonable person
that bias exists.") (citation omitted); Alabama, 828 F.2d at 1540.
21 United States v. Moore, 405 F. Supp. 771, 772 (S.D. W. Va. 1976) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (stating
that § 144 motions must be strictly construed in order to "guard against groundless
claims and the impositions they would inflict on the judicial process"), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 933 (1977).
22 See, e.g., United States v. Kelley, 712 F.2d 884, 887-88 (1st Cir. 1983) (determining that a § 144 motion could be found legally insufficient where the motion did not
include a certificate of counsel, failed to state new evidence supporting disqualification, and was untimely); Union Leader, 292 F.2d at 385 (finding a § 144 motion legally
insufficient where the certificate of counsel certified that the affiant, rather than
counsel, was acting in good faith).
The Union Leader court stressed the "indispensable value" of § 144's procedural
requirements, especially the requirement that an affidavit filed pursuant to § 144 contain a certificate of counsel stipulating that the factual allegations contained in the
complaint have been made in good faith. Id. The court reasoned: "If a certificate is
to serve the purpose of shielding a court which cannot test the truth of claimed facts,
it should at least carry the assertion that counsel believes the facts alleged to be accurate and correct." Id.
Finally, the Union Leader court noted that the strict procedural requirements of
§ 144 are not unduly burdensome because if a party fails to produce a sufficient affidavit indicating bias, the party will be protected in the future if prejudice or bias
.appear in fact during the course of trial." Id. at 389 (citations omitted).
23 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988).
24 For thorough discussions of the judicial definitions of "personal bias or prejudice," see generally Litteneker, supra note 2; Note, Disqualification of a FederalDistrict
Judge for Bias-The Standard Under Section 144, 57 MINN. L. REv. 749 (1973); Note,
Disqualification of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 HAv. L. REv. 1435 (1966)
[hereinafter Harvard Note].
25 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966). The Supreme Court
has long held that "[t]he alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem
from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis
other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case." Id. (citing Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 31 (1922)); see also United States v. Balistrieri, 779
F.2d, 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that personal bias must stem from "some
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dicial source doctrine has generally been applied to § 144 in the
2 6 with a single exception for bias that is "pervafederal
sive." 2 7 circuits
The extrajudicial
limitation established by the Supreme
source other than what the judge has learned through participation in the case")
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986); Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 756 F.2d 1322, 1329 (8th Cir. 1985) ("Facts learned by a judge in his judicial
capacity cannot be the basis for disqualification.") (citations omitted); Johnson v.
Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 1980) (maintaining that "' [e]xtrajudicial bias'
refers to a bias that is not derived from the evidence or conduct of the parties that the
judge observes in the course of the proceedings"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981);
United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 390 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that "facts learned
by a judge in his judicial capacity cannot be the basis for disqualification") (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977); United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775,
785 (2d Cir.) ("[W]hat ajudge learns in his judicial capacity-whether by way of guilty
pleas of codefendants or alleged coconspirators, or by way of pretrial proceedings, or
both-is a proper basis for judicial observations, and the use of such information is
not the kind of matter that results in disqualification."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998
(1976).
In United States v. Haldeman, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
noted that as far back as 1927, personal bias was contrasted with judicial bias and that
personal bias "'characterizes an attitude of extrajudicial origin, derived non coram
judice. 'Personal' characterizes clearly the prejudgment guarded against. It is the significant word of the statute.'" Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 132 (quotation omitted).
26 Litteneker, supra note 2, at 252.
27 See, e.g., Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents, 708 F.2d 647, 651 (lth Cir.
1983) (stating that courts will make an exception to the extrajudicial bias general rule
"when a judge's remarks in a judicial context demonstrate such pervasive bias and
prejudice that it constitutes bias against the party") (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
This "pervasive bias" exception to the extrajudicial limitation for bias is exemplified by the early case of Crowe v. Di Manno, 225 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1955). Crowe involved a personal injury action instituted by a woman who was dismembered when the
car she was driving collided with defendant's tractor trailer. Id. at 653-54. At the
outset of the opinion, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted that "the District Judge participated very actively in the trial from beginning to end." Id. at 655.
While the Court of Appeals realized that trial judges are permitted, indeed encouraged, to question witnesses in order to clarify testimony, the court articulated
that such participation must be fair, impartial, and accurate. Id.
Turning to the district judge's questioning of witnesses in the case below, however, the court of appeals cited numerous instances where the trial judge's comments
were neither fair nor impartial but rather "obviously hostile" towards the defendants
and lenient towards the plaintiff. Id. at 656-58. Based upon the district judge's "disparaging[ I" and "uncalled for" remarks towards defendants throughout the trial, the
court of appeals proffered that the district judge had, "figuratively speaking, stepped
down from the bench to assume the role of advocate for the plaintiff [and] openly
exhibited partisan zeal for the plaintiff wholly out of keeping with his office which
deprived the defendants of their fundamental right to a fair and impartial trial." Id.
at 657-59.
Relying on, among others, the Crowe decision, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit disqualified a judge for pervasive bias one year after Crowe when the court
found that the district judge's "active participation in the case and in the questioning
of witnesses exceeded what was reasonably necessary to obtain a clear understanding
of what their testimony was. . . ." Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458, 467 (6th Cir. 1956)
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Court has not only stood the test of time for disqualification under
§ 144 but has also had a profound effect on disqualification under
§ 455.28
B.

Section 455
Section 455,29 unlike § 144, has no procedural requirements

(citations omitted). Echoing the sentiments expressed by the Crowe court, the Knapp
court indicated that judicial bias is rendered personal and disqualifying:
When the remarks of the judge during the course of a trial, or his manner of handling the trial, clearly indicate a hostility to one of the parties,
or an unwarranted prejudgment of the merits of the case, or an alignment on the part of the Court with one of the parties for the purpose of
furthering or supporting the contentions of such party, the judge indicates, whether consciously or not, a personal bias and prejudice which
renders invalid any resulting judgment in favor of the party so favored.
Id. at 466 (citation omitted).
While originating for § 144 motions, the pervasive bias exception is also vigorously applied to § 455, as evidenced by the Fifth Circuit's application of the pervasive
bias exception to § 455(a) in United States v. Holland. United States v. Holland, 655
F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1981).
In Holland, the defendant, on appeal, sought to have the district judge disqualified based on the judge's comments that the defendant "broke faith" with the court
by appealing and, consequently, attempted to increase the defendant's sentence. Id.
at 45 & n.2. The appellate court ordered the judge disqualified because a reasonable
person would question the judge's impartiality where such pervasive prejudice is
shown. Id. at 47.
Likewise, in Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, recognizing that some degree of bias will no doubt develop as part of the judicial process,
nevertheless disqualified the district judge under § 455(a), stating that "'[i]f ... a
judge's bias appears to have become overpowering, we think it disqualifies him.'" Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp., 596 F.2d 152, 156 (6th Cir, 1979) (quotation omitted); see
also, Hamm 708 F.2d at 651 (stating that an exception to the general rule that bias
must be extrajudicial applies where a judge's remarks in a judicial context evidence
pervasive bias and prejudice, but noting that "[n]either a trial judge's comments on
lack of evidence, rulings adverse to a party, nor friction between the court and counsel constitute pervasive bias"); In re International Business Machines Corp., 618 F.2d
923, 928 n.6 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[C]onduct in the course of a trial might be relevant to
indicate a bias that can only be explained as a personal prejudice against a party.");
Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 838 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that the general rule
is that disqualifying bias must be extrajudicial, but that there is an exception for bias
that is pervasive); Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817, 824-25
(5th Cir. 1969) (holding that repeated accusations of bias unsupported by facts and
based upon adverse rulings are insufficient to demonstrate the quality ofjudicial bias
necessary for disqualification).
28 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966). See supra note 25 for
the extrajudicial limitation standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
Grinnell.
29 Section 455 provides:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
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(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning
the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in
controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served
during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the
judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in
such capacity participated as counsel, advisor or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse
or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in
the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or
any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome
of the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or
trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness
in the proceeding.
(c) Ajudge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary
financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself
about the personal and financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household.
(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases
shall have the meaning indicated:
(1) "proceeding" includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or
other stages of litigation;
(2) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil
law system;
(3) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, and guardian;
(4) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equitable
interest, however small, or a relationship as director, advisor, or other
active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:
(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that
holds securities is not a "financial interest" in such securities unless
the judge participates in the management of the fund;
(ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal,
or civic organization is not a "financial interest" in securities held
by the organization;;
(iii) The proprietary interest of a policy holder in a mutual
insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual savings association,
or a similar proprietary interest, is a "financial interest" in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest;
(iv) Ownership of government securities is a "financial interest" in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the securities.
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with which a party alleging bias must comply; 3 ° instead, § 455 is
self-enforcing and mandates disqualification whenever any of its
provisions are violated."1 Section 455(a) contains a general disqualification provision mandating disqualification whenever a
judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned."3 2 Next, subsection (b) enumerates specific examples of situations where
recusal is required. 3 While textually § 455(a) places no restric(e) No justice, judge, or magistrate shall accept from the parties to
the proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated
in subsection (b). Where the ground for disqualification arises only
under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided it is preceded by
a full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification.
(f) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any
justice, judge, or magistrate, or bankruptcy judge to whom a matter has
been assigned would be disqualified, after substantial judicial time has
been devoted to the matter, because of the appearance or discovery,
after the matter was assigned to him or her, that he or she individually
or as a fiduciary, or his or her spouse or minor child residing in his or
her household, has a financial interest in a party (other than an interest
that could be substantially affected by the outcome), disqualification is
not required if the justice, judge, magistrate, bankruptcy judge, spouse
or minor child, as the case may be, divests himself or herself of the
interest that provides the grounds for the disqualification.

28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988).

30 See supra note 12 for the text of § 144. While § 144 requires a party to file an
affidavit alleging bias on the part of the judge and a certificate of counsel stating that
the disqualification motion has been made in good faith, § 455 has no such procedural requirements. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the application of § 144's procedural requirements.
31 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) ("Any.. .judge ... shall disqualify himself... .") (emphasis
added). Section (b) adds further support to the mandate that the primary responsibility for disqualification is placed on the judge. Id. § 455(b) ("He shall also disqualify
himself.... .") (emphasis added). A party may also petition for disqualification under
§ 455 by motion or in the appeal process. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517
F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Hoekema, supra
note 5, at 700; see also Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1980) (determining that a party need not follow a particular procedure under § 455(a); federal judges
must observe § 455 guidelines sua sponte).
A waiver provision exists in § 455(e), providing that the parties may agree to
waive disqualification under subsection (a) but not under any of the enumerated circumstances of subsection (b). 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (1988). A waiver under subsection
(a), however, must be "preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for
disqualification." Id.
32 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988).
33 Id. § 455(b). As the focus of this Comment is on the extrajudicial limitation
applied to §§ 455(a) and 455(b)(1), the enumerated provisions of
§§ 455(b)(2),(3),(4), and (5) and 455(c),(d),(e), and (f) are beyond its scope and
will not be discussed. For detailed discussions of when factors such as past legal and
professional experience and financial interest will disqualify ajudge, see Bloom, supra
note 5, at 684-700; Burg, supra note 5, at 1447-55. See generally, Comment, Disqualification for Interest of Lower Federal Court Judges: 28 U.S.C. § 455, 71 MICH. L. Rxv. 538
(1973).
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tions on the type of bias required for disqualification, most federal
circuits have held that the extrajudicial bias limitation adopted by
34
the Supreme Court in United States v. Grinnell Corporation
for § 144
35
applies to § 455(a) as well.
All commentators who have addressed the issue however, pointing to the legislative history of
§ 455 and the wording of the section itself, have argued that
§ 455(a) was never intended to contain any restrictions on the type
of bias required for disqualification.3 6
34 384 U.S. 563 (1966). See supra note 25 and accompanying text for the Supreme
Court's adoption of the extrajudicial limitation in United States v. GrinnelL
35 See, e.g.,Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 290-92 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that
§ 455(a) did not change from § 144 the type of bias required for disqualification and
holding that statements made by the trial judge at the pretrial settlement conference
were judicial in nature and "add[ed] up more to settlement fever than personal bias
warranting recusal under either § 144 or § 455(a)"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981);
United States v. Mitchell, 886 F.2d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1989) (determining that district
judge's denial of plaintiffs motion, pursuant to § 455 (a), to postpone trial so plaintiff
could assemble evidence was not extrajudicial because the denial was not based on
anything the judge learned outside the courtroom); United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d
950, 960 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that prior recusal of trial judge from a case involving
the plaintiff for undisclosed reasons did not warrant judge's disqualification from a
second unrelated case involving the same plaintiff), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987);
United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 598-99 (6th Cir. 1990) (determining that (1)
alleged improper ex parte meeting between the trial judge and prosecutor, (2) erroneous and atypical rulings of the judge in the same year as plaintiffs case, (3) judge's
knowledge of prejudicial information, and (4) judge's improper participation in plea
negotiations were all a product of the judge's "'participation in the proceedings or
prior contact with related cases'" and as such did not warrant recusal under
§ 455(a))(quoting Wheeler v. Southland Corp., 875 F.2d 1246, 1251-52 (6th Cir.
1989)); United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867-69 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that
judge's courtroom remarks to the effect that plaintiffs case bordered on frivolousness
were insufficient to disqualify under § 455 (a) because remarks made at trial are not
extrajudicial in nature); McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11 th
Cir. 1990) (holding that plaintiffs disagreement with several evidentiary rulings made
by the district court could not be the basis for disqualification under § 455(a) because
such rulings were judicial in nature); United States v. Barry, 961 F.2d 260, 264 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (refusing to disqualify judge where judge's remarks at a Harvard Law Forum were foreshadowed by remarks the judge made at sentencing proceeding and as
such were judicial in nature and insufficient to warrant § 455 (a) disqualification).
36 Petitioner's Brief at 10, Liteky v. United States, (No. 92-9621) (On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, filed July 19,
1993) (citations omitted). See generally Bloom, supra note 5, at 691-92 (arguing that
the legislative history to § 455 specifically states that subsection (a) was separated
from subsection (b) in order to provide an independent basis forjudicial disqualification and that, under § 455(a), a judge should be disqualified whenever the judge's
impartiality could reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether the alleged bias is
judicial or extrajudicial in nature); Litteneker, supra note 2, at 254 (declaring that the
extrajudicial limitation for § 455(a) is a "judicial gloss" on the personal bias language
in §§ 455(b) (1) and 144, and that application of the limitation to § 455(a) is inconsistent with the language and purpose of the section); Martin, supra note 5, at 155 (arguing that application of § 144's strict requirement that bias must be personal and
extrajudicial to § 455 defeats Congress's intended purpose to significantly broaden
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AND CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSES BEHIND ITS
AMENDMENT

Before embarking on an analysis of the propriety of applying
the extrajudicial bias limitation to § 455, it is necessary to consider
the section prior to its amendment and the circumstances that influenced its 1974 reform. Prior to 1974, § 45537 required a federal
judge to disqualify himself in specific situations where the judge,
"in his opinion," felt that it would be improper to sit.3" Ostensibly,
the section's mandatory (shall) language made it self-enforcing;
however, because the judge was the ultimate arbiter of the "substantiality" of his interest and the relationships that would be improper, the self-enforcement provision was superfluous.3 9
Moreover, the statute was rapidly losing its bite as many courts bethe statutory grounds for judicial disqualification, thus rendering the 1974 amendments to § 455 ineffectual); Hoekema, supranote 5, at 709 (articulating that § 455(a)
was intended to "fill in gaps" and provide for disqualification when bias could not be
established under § 455(b) (1).
The remainder of this Comment will focus on the question of whether the extrajudicial bias limitation established for § 144 has been correctly applied to § 455, and
will ultimately conclude that the limitation has rightly been construed to apply to
455(a).
37 The pre-1974 § 455 provided:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or
has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any
party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to
sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988).
38 Id. This Comment has made every attempt to remain gender neutral when referring to judges generally. Because the pronouns in §§ 144 and 455 are constructed
primarily in masculine form with only the latest amendments being gender neutral,
however, certain references to judges as "him" or "himself" were necessary to accord
with the statutes and to avoid confusion.
39 See HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6352. ("The uncertainty of who was a 'near relative' or of when the judge was 'so related' caused
problems in application ....
Moreover, the statute made the judge himself the sole
decider of the substantiality of interest or of the relationships which would be improper and lead to disqualification.").
The House Report also demonstrated Congress's deep concern that the pre-1974
§ 455 conflicted with the Code ofJudicial Conduct, which contained separate requirements for disqualification. See infra note 43 for the text of the ABA Code of Judicial
Conduct. The statement to the House Report noted:
The existence of dual standards, statutory [§ 455] and ethical [Code of
Judicial Conduct], couched in uncertain language has had the effect of
forcing a judge to decide either the legal issue or the ethical issue at his
peril ....
The effect of the existing situation is not only to place the
judge on the horns of a dilemma but, in some circumstances, to weaken
public confidence in the judicial system.
HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6352.
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gan to articulate a "duty to sit" in close cases. 40
In response to growing criticism over § 455's subjectiveness
and the "duty to sit" rule,4 Congress, following the lead of the Judicial Conference of the United States,4 2 adopted the American
40 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6352. The "duty to sit"
was a "judicial gloss" on § 455 wherein "a judge, faced with a close question on disqualification, was urged to resolve the issue in favor of a 'duty to sit.'" Id. at 5, 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6355; see, e.g., Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965). The abolishment of the duty to sit was one of
the primary objectives enunciated by Congress for § 455's amendment. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 5, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6355. Congress held Edwards out to be
the paradigm of the practice they wished to terminate. Id. Therefore, it appears a
consideration of the Edwards decision, and the judge's reasons for choosing to sit in
that case, is warranted.
In a footnote at the outset of his opinion in Edwards, Judge Rives explained the
determination to sit thusly:
Judge Hays, the organ of the Court on the original opinion, is ajudge of
the Second Circuit who was sitting by designation. Judge Cameron, who
concurred with Judge Hays, died on April 5, 1964, after a rehearing en
banc was ordered but before the case was orally argued and submitted
on rehearing. Thereafter I asked the advice of my brothers, stating to
them that "since neitherJudge Hays norJudge Cameron can participate

in the en banc rehearing ...

it seems to me that to insure complete

fairness to both sides, and especially the appearance of fairness to the
appellants, I should recuse myself and let this case be considered and
decided by the remaining active judges of the Circuit."
Chief Judge Tuttle and Judges Jones, Brown and Gewin advised
that I should sit, andJudge Bell advised that he agreed with my tentative
view but did not think it inappropriate for me to sit. I did not hear from
Judges Hutcheson and Wisdom.
After such study as I could give the matter, I reached the conclusion that whether a judge should recuse himself in a particular case depends not so much on his personal preference or individual views as it
does on the law, and that, under the law, I have no choice in this case.
It is a judge's duty to refuse to sit when he is disqualified but it is equally his
duty to sit when there is no valid reasonfor recusation.... While Uudge Hays's
and Judge Cameron's] absence makes me prefer not to sit, I have not found that
it furnishes me any legal excuse.
...In the absence of a valid legal reason, I have no right to disqualify
myself and must sit.
Edwards,334 F.2d at 362-63 n.2 (emphasis added); see United States v. Diorio, 451 F.2d
21, 24 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) ("[A] trial judge is equally obligated not to recuse himself when the facts do not give fair support to a charge of
prejudgment, as he is to excuse himself when the facts warrant such action.") (citation omitted).
41 See Litteneker, supra note 2, at 238-42. For a discussion of the "duty to sit" rule
see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
42 In April, 1973, the Judicial Conference of the United States promulgated the
"Code ofJudicial Conduct for United StatesJudges." Code ofJudicialConduct for United
StatesJudges, 69 F.R.D. 273, 273 (1975). The Code was founded upon the American
Bar Association's "Code of Judicial Conduct." Id. For a brief history of the Judicial
Conference, see Warren E. Burger, The Courts on Trial,22 F.R.D. 71 (1958); A Review of
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Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C. 43 Canon
3C was codified as § 455 with minor changes." As explicitly noted
in the legislative history to § 455, Congress's primary objectives in
adopting Canon 3C were to: (1) make § 455 conform to the ABA
Code;4 5 (2) increase public confidence in the impartiality of the
judiciary by replacing the subjective standard of the old § 455 with
the Activities ofJudicialConference Committees Concerned with EthicalStandardsin the Federal
Judiciary, 1969-1976, 73 F.R.D. 247 (1976).
43 ABA CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C (1972), reprinted in HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 3, at 4-5, U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6353-54. Canon 3C read in 1972:
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to
instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;
(b) he served as lawyer in the matter of controversy, or a lawyer
with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as
a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a
material witness concerning it;
(c) he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding;
(d) he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or
trustee of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in
the proceeding;
(2) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about
the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household.
Id.
44 The most notable change was to make § 455 disqualification mandatory. This
was accomplished by stating that a judge "shall disqualify himself," 28 U.S.C. § 455
(1988) (emphasis added), rather than "should disqualify himself" as Canon 3C required. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C (1972) (emphasis added).
45 As noted by Judge Traynor during the hearings pertaining to § 455's amendment, "it [was] unseemly to have the Code of Judicial conduct, which ha[d] been
adopted by the U.S. Judicial Conference, and the statute[ ) in conflict." Proposed
Amendment to Broaden and Clarify the GroundsforJudicialDisqualification:Hearings on S.
1064 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on theJudiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974) [hereinafter House Hearings]
(statement of Judge Traynor).
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an objective one;46 and (3) remove the "duty to sit" rule established
in Edwards.47 Twenty years later, Congress appears to have been
achieved its objectives: § 455 and the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct are virtually identical,48 most courts apply an objective test
when deciding if disqualification is warranted, 49 and the concept
46 The legislative history contained in the House Report noted that the newly
amended subsection (a)
contains the general, or catch-all, provision that a judge shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which "his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned." This sets up an objective standard, rather than the subjective standard set forth in the existing statute through use of the
phrase "in his opinion". This general standard is designed to promote
public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process by saying, in
effect, if there is a reasonable factual basis for doubting the judge's impartiality, he should disqualify himself and let another judge preside
over the case.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 5, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6354-55.
47 See id.; see also supra note 40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Edwards case and its articulation of the "duty to sit" rule.
Congress explicitly stated in the legislative history to § 455 that "the language [of
amended § 455] . . . has the effect of removing the so-called 'duty to sit'....
[E]iimination of [the duty] would enhance public confidence in the impartiality of the
judicial system." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 5, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6355.
48 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988) with ABA CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E
(1990).
49 Bloom, supranote 5, at 673. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has stated,
"[t]he statute requires the judge to disqualify himself if a reasonable person, knowing
all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about his impartiality." Hall v. Small Business Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted); see United States v.
Mitchell, 886 F.2d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1989). The Mitchell court noted that actual bias
on the part of the judge is not necessary. Mitchel4 886 F.2d at 671. Instead, the court
determined the question to be only "'whether another, not knowing whether or not
the judge is actually impartial, might reasonably question his impartiality on the basis
of all the circumstances.'" Id. (quotation omitted).
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained: "[U]nder § 455(a)
an actual demonstrated prejudice need not exist in order for a judge to recuse himself: 'disqualification should follow if the reasonable man, were he to know all the
circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality.'" United States v.
Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1541 (11th Cir. 1987) (quotation omitted); see also United
States v. Barry, 961 F.2d 260, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (articulating that extrajudicial remarks will not warrant disqualification "unless they are of such a character that 'an
informed observer would reasonably question the judge's impartiality'") (quotation
omitted).
In the above-noted cases, all of the courts noted that the reasonable person objective test that is applied under § 455(a) is only required for bias that is derived from
an extrajudicial source. At least.one circuit has argued however, that an objective test
is required to determine disqualification regardless of whether the alleged bias
originated in a judicial or extrajudicial capacity. United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d
1018, 1024 (1st Cir. 1990). In Chanta, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected the extrajudicial bias limitation and declared that "[tihe question under

§ 455(a) ' . . . is not whether the judge's statement springs from an extrajudicial

source but instead whether the judge's statement or action would lead a reasonable
person to question whether the judge would remain impartial.'" Id. (quoting
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that judges have a duty to sit in close cases has been abandoned by
50
most circuits.
Despite the apparent fulfillment of the congressional objectives behind § 455's amendment, commentators have assailed the
position taken in most circuits that judicial bias, untainted by extrajudicial factors, cannot be disqualifying.5" A consideration of the
different approaches taken by the circuits to justify application of
the extrajudicial limitation demonstrates that while their reasons
for applying the standard differ, there is almost universal consensus that judicially acquired bias cannot be disqualifying.
III.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT APPROACHES TO LIMITING BIAS TO
EXTRAJUDICIAL SOURCES

The extrajudicial bias limitation was recently applied to
§ 455(a) by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit in United States v. Barry.52 In Barry, the District of
Columbia's mayor, Marion S. Barry, appealed a district court order
Hoekema, supra note 5, at 717).
Chantal decision.

See infra notes 81-88 for a full discussion of the

Based on the language of § 455(a), the First Circuit's reading of the statute is
understandable. A full understanding of the legislative history of § 455, however, renders the circuit's position questionable.
50 See, e.g., United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 139 n.360 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977) (acknowledging that there was a duty to sit before § 455
was amended, but stating that one of the explicit purposes of the new § 455 was to
abolish the duty). The Haldeman court was careful to qualify its general proposal that
the duty to sit had been abolished with the amendment of § 455 by quoting the following cautionary advice contained in the legislative history to § 455:
[W] hile the proposed legislation would remove the "duty to sit" concept
of present law, a cautionary note is in order. No judge, of course, has a
duty to sit where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. However, the new test should not be used by judges to avoid sitting on difficult or controversial cases.
Id. (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 5, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6355.); see also
Bradley v. Milliken, 620 F.2d 1143, 1156-57 n.5 (6th Cir. 1980)(noting that courts
have agreed that the purpose of amending § 455 was to overrule the duty to sit
doctrine).
While there is agreement among the courts that the new § 455 eliminated the
duty to sit doctrine, certain commentators have pointed out that some courts have
retained a limited version of the duty. See Litteneker, supra note 2, at 241 n.26 (stating that some courts have managed to retain a limited version of the duty to sit doctrine by according the judge a presumption of impartiality and shifting the burden of
proof to the movant to overcome that presumption) (citations omitted); Bloom, supra
note 5, at 673 n.65 (noting that certain courts have articulated a narrower version of
the duty to sit doctrine).
51 See supra note 36 and accompanying text for the criticisms of commentators on
the courts' importation of the extrajudicial bias limitation, established for § 144, to
amended § 455(a).
52 961 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
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that, on remand, resentenced him to prison for six months on a
cocaine possession charge.5 3 In his appeal, Barry sought, inter alia,
the disqualification of District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson,
based on remarks Judge Jackson made, four days after sentencing
Barry, at a Harvard Law School Criminal Justice Institute forum.5 4
The Barry court declared that almost every remark cited by
Barry in his § 455(a) motion to disqualify had been foreshadowed
by Judge Jackson's comments at the sentencing four days before
the Harvard forum. 55 Because Judge Jackson's remarks at sentencing were based upon the judge's observations of the evidence, the
court had little trouble concluding that the remarks were derived
from a judicial source and, as such, could not be the basis for disqualification under § 455(a).56
Id. at 261
Id. at 261-62. The forum was entitled "Presiding Over the Marion Barry Trial."
Id. at 262. Judge Jackson's remarks, recounted by two students who had been present
at the forum, were as follows:
(Judge Jackson said] he is convinced Barry is guilty of perjury and other
crimes and that "he has never seen a stronger government case."... I
53
54

am not happy with the way the jury addressed this case ....

Some

people on the jury ...had their own agendas. They would not convict
under any circumstances." The judge said he believes four jurors were
determined to acquit regardless of the facts. He said they "obviously did
not tell the truth" during jury selection when questioned about possible
bias.
Id. at 264 (citation omitted).
55 Id. Judge Jackson's remarks at Mayor Barry's sentencing proceeding, which preceded the judge's Harvard lecture by four days, were:
There are . . . other aggravating circumstances to be taken into

account. First, although the verdict represents the defendant's first conviction, and is of what some might call a minor crime, the court finds
that the offense of which he stands convicted was neither his first nor
his last such offense.
Second, I find from the evidence that the defendant employed subterfuge and false testimony-his own and that of others-in an attempt
to avoid exposure and prosecution altogether.
The court concludes the defendant's conduct in that regard represented a willful attempt at obstruction of justice.
I am ignoring, for the purposes of sentencing, what I perceive to
have been the defendant's efforts, once prosecution had commenced,
to induce the jury to disregard the law and the evidence. Thejurors will
have to answer to themselves and to their fellow citizens for the way in
which they discharged their duty.
Id. (citation omitted).
56 See id. at 263-65. The Barry court prefaced its opinion by declaring that "[the
District of Columbia has] long held that to be disqualifying, the appearance of bias or
prejudice must stem from an extrajudicial source. Ajudge's comments on a case are
deemed to be 'extrajudicial' only if they have 'some basis other than what the judge
learned from his participation in the case.'" Id. at 263 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966)) (additional citations omitted).
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The Barry court did, however, note that Judge Jackson's comments at the forum-suggesting that certain jurors may have lied
about their impartiality during the jury selection process-were derived from an extrajudicial source because the remarks could not
have been based upon the judge's earlier findings. Nevertheless,
the court concluded that a reasonable person would not question
Judge Jackson's impartiality based on those remarks alone and,
consequently, denied Barry's § 455(a) motion.58
The Barry opinion demonstrates an approach to § 455 (a) disqualification whereby the court will expressly refuse to consider
any bias that is judicial in nature, and will apply an objective standard for bias deemed to have been extrajudicially obtained. 9 This
approach to disqualification is similar to the approach taken in the
60
Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.
Next, the court demonstrated the District of Columbia Circuit's strict adherence
to the rule that, under § 455(a), only extrajudicial bias can be disqualifying when it
declared that "remarks reflecting even strong views about a defendant will not call for
a judge's recusal so long as those views are based on [the judge's] own observations
during the performance of his judicial duties." Id.
Finally, the court noted that if remarks are in fact grounded in an extrajudicial
source, then the proper standard to evaluate them under § 455 is an objective, reasonable person test. Id.
57 Id. at 264.
58 Id. at 264-65. The court acknowledged that Judge Jackson had, no doubt, developed extremely strong feelings about Mayor Barry's use of cocaine while in public
office. Id. at 265. The court quoted at length from Judge Jackson's comments during
sentencing where the judge openly declared that "proportionate justice" indicated
that Barry should receive a sentence similar to the 35- or 12-year sentences recently
handed down by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for small-time drug
users in other cases. Id.
The Bary court determined, however, that a reasonable person would not question Judge Jackson's impartiality by placing great emphasis on the fact that, despite
his strong feelings, Judge Jackson only sentenced Barry to six months in jail rather
than the full eight months that the judge believed was authorized under the sentencing guidelines. Id. According to the Court of Appeals:
[There is] no trace of bias in this sentencing, and we cannot believe that
a reasonable observer familiar with this record could believe that Judge
Jackson would later punish Barry for the additional sins of four jurors
he already believed had betrayed their duty. We conclude, therefore,
that § 455(a) did not require Judge Jackson's disqualification.
Id.
59 See supra note 49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the objective standard employed by most courts to evaluate alleged extrajudicial bias.
60 See United States v. Mitchell, 886 F.2d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that a
judge's refusal to postpone trial was judicial in nature and could not be the basis for
disqualification and that other conduct-such as the judge's awareness of a taped
telephone conversation between the plaintiff and the judge's wife-although extrajudicial, would not lead a reasonable person to question the judge's impartiality);
United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1545-46 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that trial
judge should have disqualified himself under § 455 (a) when the judge had personal
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The problem with such an analysis is that it incorporates a
limitation on bias established for § 144, because the section contains the word "personal,"6 1 into a § 455(a) analysis, even though
there is no such "personal" requirement contained therein.6 2 No
justification is offered by the above-mentioned circuits as to how a
§ 144 limitation, created long before § 455 was amended, is relevant to an amended § 455(a) analysis.6"
Both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have attempted to offer an
explanation as to why the extrajudicial limitation of § 144 must be
incorporated into § 455.' These circuits hold that both sections
are to be construed in pari materia65 and that § 455 (a) disqualification must be based, as before under § 144, upon extrajudicial conduct only.6 6 This explanation has met with considerable criticism
extrajudicial knowledge of disputed facts which would raise a question about his ability to be impartial); Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322, 1329 (8th
Cir. 1985) (determining that ajudge's rulings on evidentiary matters and certain comments, with the exception of one, made during trial were judicial and insufficient for
§ 455(a) motion and that the excepted comment, although extrajudicial, would not
lead a reasonable person to question the judge's impartiality); Johnson v. Trueblood,
629 F.2d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that judicial bias does not warrant recusal
because such bias can be reviewed on appeal), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981) .
In Johnson, the court spent most of its efforts inquiring whether or not comments
made at a pretrial settlement conference can be considered extrajudicial. Id. at 29091. The court found such an inquiry relevant because, in its own words, "only extrajudicial bias requires disqualification." Id. Determining that judges can develop opinions prior to trial based upon the evidence and the conduct of the parties, the Third
Circuit declared that such pretrial emotions were not extrajudicial in nature and thus
insufficient to require an objective analysis under § 455(a). Id. at 291-92.
61 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the word
"personal" contained in § 144 has been defined by the United States Supreme Court
as meaning "extrajudicial."
62 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988) with Id. § 455(a).
63 See Bloom, supra note 5, at 674-76 (arguing that because § 144 and § 455(b) (1)
contain the word "personal" and § 455 (a) does not, there were meant to be two separate bias tests under the sections, and that §§ 144 and 455(b) (1) require a "bias-in-fact
test" while § 455(a) requires only an "appearance of bias test").
64 See generally Easley v. University of Michigan Bd. of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351 (6th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Story, 716 F.2d 1088 (6th Cir. 1983); Davis v. Board of Sch.
Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
65 In pari materia is a rule of statutory construction stating that "statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read, construed and applied together so
that the legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactment
.... BLACK'S LAw DICTnONARY 791 (6th ed. 1990).
66 Story, 716 F.2d at 1091 (citations omitted). Indeed, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits
appear to have incorporated the word "personal" into their test for § 455 disqualification. The Fifth Circuit has declared that "[u]nder both § 144 and § 455, the alleged
bias or prejudice must be personaland it must stem from an extrajudicial source which
would result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge
learned from his participation in the case." United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 960
(5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987).
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67
from commentators as well as other circuits.
The Ninth Circuit, while not explicitly stating that §§ 144 and
455 must be read in pari materia, has, through its decisions, reached
a similar conclusion. 68 The circuit has held that the same substantive standard must be applied to § 144 and § 455(a) .69 In United
States v. Olander,the Ninth Circuit determined that interpretations
of § 144 are controlling for interpretations under § 455(b) (1).70
The circuit next determined that the same test applied to
§ 455(b) (1) applies to § 455(a) as well. 71 The circuit reached a

Likewise, the Sixth Circuit has declared that "bias must be personal or extrajudicial in order to justify recusal under § 455(a)." United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d
592, 599 (6th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit has defined personal
bias as "bias [that] arises out of the judge's background and associations." Id. (quoting
Wheeler v. Southland Corp., 875 F.2d 1246, 1251-52 (6th Cir. 1989)).
Both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits' requirement that disqualifying bias under
§ 455 must be personal appears to be incorrect as § 455(b) plainly includes the term
and was meant to cover circumstances where bias "arises out of the judge's background and associations." See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) supra (1988). Thus, the Fifth and
Sixth Circuits' inclusion of the term personal into a § 455(a) analysis appears to be
redundant and a far too narrow reading of the statute.
67 Bloom, supra note 5, at 676; David C. Hjelmfelt, Statutory Disqualificationof FederalJudges, 30 KAN. L. REV. 255, 262 (1982) ("[R]eading the two sections inpari materia
violates the usual rules of statutory construction. Section 144 was enacted in 1911 and
§ 455(a) was amended in 1974, thus there can be no argument that the sections were
pieces of companion legislation and should therefore be read together.")
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits' reading together of §§ 144 and 455 has also been
criticized by other circuits. See, e.g., Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114, 1116 (4th Cir.
1978) (stating that § 455(a) is intended to have a broader scope than § 455(b) (1));
United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459, 462 (10th Cir.) (acknowledging that § 144 requires a bias in fact standard but noting that § 455(a), as amended, is broader than
§ 144 and creates an appearance of bias test), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 951 (1976). See
generally United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
909 (1977).
68 See, e.g., United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying the
same substantive standard to §§ 144 and 455); United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d
869, 880-81 (9th Cir.) (arguing that the same test applies to § 455 as to § 144), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); United States v. Olander, 584 F.2d 876, 882 (9th Cir.
1978) (arguing that the legislative history to § 455 does not indicate that amended
§ 455 was meant to have a different test than § 144).
69 Conforte, 624 F.2d at 880-81.
70 Olander, 585 F.2d at 882.
71 Id. The circuit determined that "it would be incorrect as a matter of statutory
construction to interpret § 455(a) as setting up a different test for disqualification for
bias or prejudice from that in § 455(b) (1)." Id. This is so, the circuit determined,
because subsection (b) is an enumeration of some of the types of bias that will warrant
disqualification and, as such, the same test applies for both. Id.
This approach has also been criticized by commentators. It has been argued that
this approach is contrary to the legislative history of § 455(a) as "[t] he committee report explicitly states that § 455(a) was intended not only to broaden the grounds for
disqualification, but to establish grounds for disqualification distinct from those in
subsection (b)." Bloom, supra note 5, at 675. Bloom's criticism is based on language
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curious result in United States v. Conforte, however, as the test that
the circuit applied to both subsection (a) and (b) is an objective
test that does not seem to distinguish between judicial and extrajudicial bias.7 2
The most cogent and persuasive argument justifying the transfer of the extrajudicial limitation from § 144 to § 455 (a) was made
by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
contained in the legislative history which declared that "[t] hese specific situations in
subsection (b) are in addition to the general standard set forth in subsection (a)."
HoUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 5-6, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6355 (emphasis added).

The Ninth Circuit, however, also appears to recognize the intended distinction
between § 455(a) and § 455(b)(1). See Conforte, 624 F.2d at 880-81. In the Conforte
opinion, the court specifically stated:
The standard for measuring the grounds of disqualification is similar
[under § 455(a) and (b)(1)], but the sections reach different factual
contexts. Olanderdoes not undercut the recognition that there may be
cases within subsection (a) that are not within subsection (b); and we
think this must be so or subsection (e), which allows waiver of disqualification under the former subsection but not the latter, would be without
meaning ....

[S]ubsection (a) is designed to cover contingencies not

foreseen by the draftsmen, who set out specific grounds for disqualification under subsection (b) ....

When these specific instances are pres-

ent, the inquiry must proceed under subsection (b), rather than
subsection (a), and waivers may not be accepted.
Id.
The Ninth Circuit's argument that Congress separated subsection (a) from subsection (b) only to distinguish the circumstances when waivers are to be accepted has
merit and has been suggested by at least one commentator. See Burg, supranote 5, at
1481-82 n.228 ("The separation into § 455(a) and § 455(b) may have been done only
to distinguish clearly between acceptable and unacceptable situations of waiver.").
There is also evidence in § 455(a)'s legislative history suggesting that the "personal" requirement of § 144 and, consequently, the extrajudicial bias limitation that
had developed as a result of the personal requirement, was intended to apply to
amended § 455(a). See House Hearings, supra note 45, at 14-15. In testimony before
the House Committee regarding the meaning of the amended § 455(a), John P.
Frank described the words "any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned" as "terms of art" that were "meant to cover the kind of thing where,
for example, personal relationships are involved." Id.; see infra note 76 (setting forth a
more detailed discussion of Frank's testimony). Contra Litteneker, supra note 2, at
254 ("Such a strict interpretation ... seems to accord neither with the language nor
the purpose of the amendment .... The purpose of the section-to guarantee disqualification whenever a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned-suggests that disqualification is necessary regardless of the source of the appearance of
bias.").
72 Conforte, 624 F.2d at 881. The Conforte court explained the Ninth Circuit's test
for bias this way:
[W]e think the test under either subsection (a) or (b) is the same,
namely, whether or not given all the facts of the case there are reasonable grounds for finding that the judge could not try the case fairly,
either because of the appearance or the fact of bias or prejudice.
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in United States v. Haldeman.73 In Haldeman, the court noted that
the extrajudicial bias limitation existed and was applied to the pre1974 § 455 long before the section was amended. 4 Yet the court
noted that nothing in the legislative history to the section intimated that the limitation was meant to be abolished. 5 Indeed,
there is not a single mention of the time-honored extrajudicial
source requirement in the legislative history to amended § 455.76
73 United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
933 (1977).
74 Id. at 133 n.297.
75 Id. The words that the Haldeman court used to retain the extrajudicial bias limitation are worth noting. The court stated:
For a long time before enactment of new § 455(a) in 1974, the judicial
understanding of§ 144 and old § 455 was that they were to be confined
in operation to extrajudicial conduct or conditions. Nothing we have
observed in the legislative history of new § 455 (a) suggests that this construction was to be overturned. The Fifth Circuit has concluded that
new § 455(a) is to be similarly interpreted. Absent clearer guidance as
to the congressional intent, we agree, and by the same token, we might
add, Canon 3(C) (1) is to be similarly read. The appearance-of-impropriety standard in terms summons a disqualification, not merely when
the judge's impartiality might somehow be questioned, but only when it
may reasonably be questioned. We think reasonableness of the challenge
must take due account of the effect which its acceptance will have on
the judicial process. So drastic would be the impact that we are unwilling to ascribe to ethical and legislative formulators of that standard a
purpose to direct it toward judicial rulings on questions of law.
Id. (citations omitted). See Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th
Cir. 1975) (finding "no suggestion in the legislative history that these decisions [adopting the extrajudicial bias limitation] were being overruled or in anywise eroded"), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
This reasoning is extremely persuasive as one can assume (in fact, one must) that
Congress was aware of the long line of both pre-and post-Grinnellcases that required
bias to stem from an extrajudicial source to be disqualifying.
76 See generallyHouse Hearings, supra note 45. While there are no specific references
to the extrajudicial bias limitation contained in the legislative history of § 455, there
are a number of remarks which indicate that, if anything, the limitation was meant to
be retained, not abolished. For example, John P. Frank, an expert on judicial ethics
and the principal witness to the legislative hearings on S. 1064, the bill which would
ultimately become amended § 455, engaged in the following exchange with Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier, the Chairman of the House Subcommittee that considered the bill:
MR. KASTMNMEIER. I am wondering what the practical meaning of this is:
Any justice shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
MR. FRANv. May I address myself to that? As you have said, the committee does not deal with this commonly and therefore you may be unaware that these are terms of art. These are not empty words, what they
do is adopt the ABA standard as it has existed since 1922, and as it has
been interpreted over and over again by the ABA canons and decisions
around the country.... I want to make loud and clear for purposes of
this record, because I assume that this record may have importance for
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In view of the conspicuous absence of any reference to the limitation in Congress's clearly enunciated objectives for amending
§ 455, it would be curious to assume that Congress's silence on the
doctrine was, in fact, an implicit rejection of the doctrine.7 7
Again, this is not to say that under a Haldeman analysis ajudge,
so long as he or she makes references to the facts of the case, is free
to flaunt an outright bias against a party. Courts have carefully created an exception to the extrajudicial limitation where judicial bias
is "pervasive." 78 The "pervasive bias" standard is the appropriate
standard under which to evaluate judicial bias because it pays heed
to both of Congress's objectives-it silently affirms the extrajudicial
limitation 79 while simultaneously increasing public confidence in
many, many years in the future, that this does not mean that judges are
going to be casually getting off the bench or that somebody can march
into ajudge and say, "Well, Ijust don't feel comfortable with you. I wish
you would go away. I question your impartiality." That is not to happen
at all.
For example, it has been the fixed practice that a judge may have
developed points of view on a matter because he has handled the same
matter previously and been involved in it; something of that sort. To
that event he has made up his mind. To challenge on that ground is
not permitted by this clause at all. It is meant to cover the kind of thing
where, for example, personal relationships are involved. Ajudge may in
fact have personal ties of friendship ... so close with a litigant that he
feels that it is just not right for him to be in that case. This permits him
to take himself out, in that (sic] circumstances.
Id. at 14-15. The "point of view" that judges gain when "involved" in a matter, which
Mr. Frank addresses in his comments, is arguably nothing more than judicial bias, and
his contrast of this bias with "personal" bias or prejudice is simply a contrast between
judicial and extrajudicial bias; the former being wholly insufficient for § 455(a) disqualification, and the latter requiring disqualification whenever disqualification
would be the "reasonable" choice.
77 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,
501 (1986) ("The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for
legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that
intent specific.") (citation omitted).
Indeed, where Congress intended to change the "judicially created concept" of
the "duty to sit," which was being applied to the old § 455, it had no tr6uble announcing its intentions in a clear manner. See supra note 47 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Congress's explicit desire to eliminate the duty to sit doctrine. Arguably,
the extrajudicial limitation for bias is as fundamental a doctrine to judicial disqualification law as the duty to sit doctrine; it would be illogical to assume that Congress's
explicit elimination of the latter was meant to be an implicit elimination of the former. The author of this Comment maintains that Congress's failure to include the
extrajudicial bias limitation in its clearly enumerated objectives for amended § 455
should be understood as a silent affirmation of the doctrine, not an implicit rejection.
78 See supra note 27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pervasive bias
exception to the extrajudicial bias limitation.
79 See supra note 75 (arguing that the exclusion of the extrajudicial bias limitation
from the legislative history of § 455 should be read as an affirmation of the doctrine).
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0
the impartiality of judges. 8

IV.

THE FIRST CIRCUIT REJECTS THE EXTRAJUDICIAL BIAS
LIMITATION

In United States v. Chantal the First Circuit completely disavowed the extrajudicial limitation applied by its sister circuits."
In Chantal, appeal was taken from a decision of the United States
District Court for the District of Maine, where Chief Judge Gene
Carter refused to disqualify himself from a proceeding despite having made strong remarks about the defendant when sentencing
him in a prior case.8 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit flatly
rejected Judge Carter's reasons for refusing to disqualify himself
below, noticing that Judge Carter had utilized the wrong standard
in the lower court opinion. 3 The Chantalcourt noted that Judge
80 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting that the primary objective behind amending § 455 was to enhance public confidence in the judicial process).
The pervasive bias exception increases public confidence in the judiciary because
it ensures that a judge will not be disqualified based upon the "points of view" the
judge may have developed at trial unless those views are clearly prejudicial.
81 United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018 (1st Cir. 1990).
82 Id at 1019-20. Judge Carter's remarks about defendant Chantal at a prior sentencing hearing were as follows:
I can have no confidence whatever that [you] will change [your] ways in
the future. The Court views this case in terms of sentencing to be a
more serious case than apparently the Government does. This is an
individual who has had a privileged pattern of existence, a lot of family
support, and an intact family that was very supportive of him, who undertakes to become actively involved, to profit only, as near as I can tell,
in the distribution of cocaine, and was involved in it over a period of
time, and repeatedly comes back to the distribution of cocaine. I have
seen no indication whatever that he has in any way expressed here or
anywhere else any remorse or regret for this course of conduct. And I
think this is very, very serious, that if people cannot concede or conceive
of the ultimate evil of this substance and the practice of distributing it to
people even after they've been caught and convicted, I can have no confidence that they are not going to, at the first opportunity they have
after they leave this courtroom following sentencing, go right back to the
same type of activity.
My consideration of all the information I have about this Defendant and my observations of his demeanor on every occasion, including
today, when he's been before this Court, indicates to me that he is an
unreconstructed drug trafficker; and I can have no confidence whatever that
he will change his ways in the future.
Id. at 1019-20.
83 Id. at 1021. Judge Carter stated the reasons for refusing to disqualify himself as
follows:
As to Defendant's Motion to Recuse-After a full review of the written
submissions of the parties on the within motion it is hereby DENED.
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Carter's reliance on the extrajudicial limitation would be on "solid
ground" in other circuits but declared that the First Circuit had
aligned itself with all commentators who had addressed the issue
and determined that judicial bias could be disqualifying.8 4
The court contrasted its interpretation of amended § 455 with
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' interpretation8 5 and declared that,
unlike circuits which apply the same standard to §§ 455(a) and
455(b) (1), the First Circuit would consider § 455 (a) to provide an
independent basis for disqualification. 86 Determining that comments made at trial or the circumstances of their origin are not
pertinent under § 455(a), the Chantal court declared that the standard in any § 455(a) disqualification was a simple reasonable person test." Accordingly, the Chantalcourt remanded to allowJudge
The Defendant has failed to support the motion with the affidavit required under 28 U.S.C. § 144. Further, the allegation of fact in support
of the motion clearly implies that the basisfor the claim of bias orprejudice is
information known to the judge because of his performance of judicial duties in
Defendant's prior case. The information is not from an "extra-judicial
source" and is therefore not an adequate basis to force recusal.
Id. at 1020 n.3 (citations omitted). The circuit court declared thatJudge Carter "was
judging his appearance of impartiality by the wrong standard." Id. at 1021.
84 Id. at 1021-22 The court declared that "[t] he First Circuit... has repeatedly
subscribed to what all commentators characterize as the correct view that, unlike challenges under 28 U.S.C. § 144, the source of the asserted bias/prejudice in a § 455(a)
claim can originate explicitly in judicial proceedings." Id. at 1022.
The court quoted extensively from a 1978 First Circuit opinion where that court
stated:
We recognize that the newly amended recusal provision, 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a) now permits disqualification of'judges even if alleged prejudice
is a result of judicially acquired information in contradistinction to the
prior law that required a judge to hear a case unless he had developed
preconceptions by means of extrajudicial sources. The rationality for
the amendments to the statute ...

was "to foster public confidence in

the judicial system" by requiring disqualification based on "a reasonable
factual basis for doubting the judge's impartiality".
Id. at 1022 (quoting United States v. Cepeda Penes, 577 F.2d 754, 758 (1st Cir. 1978)).
85 See supranotes 64-72 for a discussion of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' interpretation of § 455(a).
86 Id. at 1023. The court noted that "[t]he question under § 455(a) '...
is not
whether the judge's statement springs from an extrajudicial source but instead
whether the judge's statement or action would lead a reasonable person to question
whether the judge would remain impartial.'" Id. at 1024 (quoting Hoekema, supra
note 5, at 717).
87 Id. at 1024. The court simply asked: "would a reasonable, responsibleperhaps even a nonjudge-person have doubts about the judge's impartiality?" Id. The
court labelled this § 455(a) disqualification test "the Cowden question" as it was patterned after a test established in United States v. Cowden. Id. In Cowden, the court
asked:
[W] hether the charge of lack of impartiality is grounded on facts that
would create a reasonable doubt concerning the judge's impartiality,
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Carter to determine whether or not the judge should disqualify
himself under the proper standards enunciated by the Chantal
court.8 8
V.

CONFLICT WITHIN THE CONFLICT: THIRD CIRCUIT CONFUSION

Perhaps even more disturbing than the conflict among the
federal circuits regarding the extrajudicial bias issue is an apparent
conflict within the Third Circuit itself 89 The Third Circuit originally established itself as a staunch proponent of the extrajudicial
limitation. 0 The circuit's position is extremely questionable, however, in light of its recent decision in Haines v. Liggett Group Inc.9"
The Third Circuit adhered to the extrajudicial limitation in
Johnson v. Trueblood, where minority shareholders of a corporation
filed a shareholders' derivative action against the majority shareholders. 2 After numerous settlement attempts failed and a
number of mistrials were declared, a noticeable tension developed
both between the parties and between the trial judge and plaintiffs.9 3 When trial finally commenced, plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to § 144 to have the district judge disqualified.9 4 The district
judge also determined, sua sponte, whether he should recuse himself pursuant to § 455(a). 95 The district judge denied both the
plaintiff's § 144 motion and his own § 455(a) recusal.9 6
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit addressed the issue of whether the district judge had properly denied the recusal motions. 97 The court began by noting that
the Third Circuit's position under both § 144 and 455(a) was that
bias, to be disqualifying, must stem from an extrajudicial source.9"
not in the mind of the judge himself or even necessarily in the mind of
the litigant filing the motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455, but rather in the

mind of the reasonable man.
United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 265 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 909
(1977).
88 Chanta4 902 F.2d at 1024.
89 CompareJohnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
999 (1981) with Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992).
90 Johnson, 629 F.2d at 290-91 (3d Cir. 1980).
91 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992), discussed infra at notes 102-31.
92 Johnson, 629 F.2d at 289, 290-91.
93 Id. at 289-90.
94 Id. at 290. The plaintiffs based their § 144 motion on "certain scheduling and

other rulings by the district court." Id. at 291.
95 Id. at 290.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 290-92.
98 Id. at 290-91. The court compared § 144 to § 455(a) and concluded:
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Accordingly, the court determined that ajudge's rulings could not
be the basis for recusal under either section.9 9
Having firmly established that any bias, to be disqualifying,
must stem from an extrajudicial source, the court turned its attention to certain pro-defendant and anti-plaintiff comments made by
the district judge at settlement negotiations to determine if they
could be considered extrajudicial1 t° Notwithstanding that the
comments were made at a settlement conference, the court of appeals deemed them judicial in nature and insufficient to disqualify
under § 455(a) because the district judge's comments were based
upon the judge's perception of the case. 10 1
Although Congress has not indicated the precise parameters of the two
provisions... both statutes require the same type of bias for recusal ....
In general, it seems that § 455(a) was intended only to change the
standard the district judge is to apply to his or her conduct; it does not
alter the type of bias required for recusal. Thus the rule under § 144
continues [for § 455(a)] that only extrajudicial bias requires
disqualification.
Id. (citations omitted).
Thus, the Third Circuit appears to have subscribed to the same philosophy employed by the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Haldeman, which articulated that Congress was well aware of the extrajudicial limitation but never indicated
that the limitation was meant to be abolished. See supra notes 73-77 for a discussion
of the Haldeman case and the reasons that court proffered in support of retaining the
extrajudicial bias limitation. The "standard" to which the court referred, which Congress intended to change by amending § 455(a), is no doubt a reference to the pre1974 subjective standard that a judge was required to disqualify himself "in his opinion" whenever the judge found recusal appropriate. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's explicit intent to change the pre-1974 subjective
standard for § 455 disqualification to an objective one).
99 Id. at 291.
100 Id. During settlement negotiations, the district judge made statements to the
plaintiffs that the lawsuit had been a "'personal tragedy for the defendants' who were
'honest men of high character.' He also questioned the plaintiffs' motives in bringing
the lawsuit and stated that plaintiff Gilbert Johnson was unable to reason logically
from A to B." Id.
101 Id. at 291-92. The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs' argument that, because
the comments were made before trial had even begun, they were necessarily extrajudicial. Id. at 291. The court declared that a "judge often can get a feel for a case prior
to trial, which means that his perceptions can be based on the conduct of the parties
and the evidence. Thus feelings about a case are not necessarily 'extrajudicial' solely
because they are made during settlement negotiations." Id.
The court realized that a blanket rule holding all comments made by a judge
before trial extrajudicial, without an inquiry as to whether the comments were based
upon the judge's evaluation of the case, rather than upon personal animus or prejudice would "unduly hamper [a] judge's ability to effectuate settlement." Id. Specifically, the court declared: "The relevant inquiry is whether the trial judge's pretrial
comments were linked to his evaluation of the case based on the pleadings and other
materials outlining the nature of the case, or whether the comments were based on
purely personal feelings towards the parties and the case." Id.
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The Third Circuit's opinion in Johnson, however, is a far cry
from its recent decision in Haines v. Liggett Group Inc."°2 In Haines,
respondent Susan Haines, as administratrix of her deceased husband's estate, filed a personal injury action against various leading
tobacco companies'
based on theories of product liability, conspiracy, and tort.1 °4 Pursuant to a discovery request by Haines, a
council created by the tobacco companies 10 5 to study the health
hazards of smoking produced more than 2000 documents but withheld approximately 1500 others, claiming that the withheld documents fell into the privileged categories of attorney-client
communications and work product. 10 6 Haines argued that any
privilege to the documents was annulled under the crime-fraud exception. 107 A magistrate judge determined that the crime-fraud ex10 8
ception did not apply to the documents.
Haines appealed the magistrate's conclusion regarding the
non-applicability of the crime-fraud exception to the district
court. 10 9 District Judge H. Lee Sarokin, in an opinion issued February 6, 1992, addressed the applicability of the crime-fraud exception to the disputed documents. 110 The judge found "prima facie
evidence" of an ongoing fraud by the defendants and that the
crime-fraud exception applied to some of the documents.1 1 ' Judge
Sarokin accordingly reversed the magistrate's order as to those
documents.1 12 Based upon Judge Sarokin's opening remarks in his
opinion, the defendant tobacco companies then petitioned the
Third Circuit for a writ of mandamus to vacate Judge Sarokin's order and to have the case assigned, pursuant to the court's supervi975 F.2d 81 (1992).
The companies sued by Haines were "Liggett Group, Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Loew's Theatres, Inc., Philip Morris Incorporated and the Tobacco Institute." Id. at 85.
104 Id.
105 The council, entitled "Council for Tobacco Research," was the successor to the
"Tobacco Industry Research Committee." Id. The council, through a grant program
under the direction of the Scientific Advisory Board, funded independent research; it
did not conduct original research. Id.
106 Id. Specifically, the council produced "(1) all correspondence, memoranda, research proposals, and research results prepared by the researchers themselves or
others working under their direction; and (2) all correspondence to or from researchers, including correspondence with petitioners or their counsel." Id.
107 Id. at 86.
102
103

108 Id.

Id. at 87.
110 Id.
109

111 Id. at 88.
112 Id.
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The Third Circuit began its disqualification analysis by noting
that "the press reported these remarks prominently."" 4 Next, the

court acknowledged that the right to trial by an impartial judge is
constitutionally mandated under the Due Process Clause.1 5 The
court further noted that it had supervisory power to mandate that
cases be assigned to a different judge when such reassignment was
1 6
necessary to avoid the appearance of partiality.'

113 Id. at 88, 97. The tobacco industry claimed that the case had to be reassigned
because Judge Sarokin was "so prejudiced against them that they [could] not hope to
get a fair trial." Id. at 97. The companies based their claim of bias on the opening
paragraphs of Judge Sarokin's opinion, where he stated:
In the light of the current controversy surrounding breast implants, one
wonders when all industries will recognize their obligation to voluntarily
disclose risks from the use of their products. All too often in the choice
between the physical health of consumers and the financial well-being
of business, concealment is chosen over disclosure, sales over safety, and
money over morality. Who are these persons who knowingly and
secretly decide to put the buying public at risk solely for the purpose of
making profits and who believe that illness and death of consumers is
an appropriate cost of their own prosperity!
As the following facts disclose, despite some rising pretenders, the
tobacco industry may be the king of concealment and disinformation.
Id.
114 Id. The court cited newspaper articles appearing in the New York Times, Wall
Street Journal, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, and New
Jersey Star Ledger as evidence of this fact. The court made no further reference to
the articles in the opinion. Presumably, the court referred to the press coverage to
indicate that a public having read the articles might reasonably question Judge
Sarokin's impartiality. Reliance on newspaper articles to demonstrate that the public
might question a judge's impartiality would, however, be far off the mark from the
objective test Congress intended for § 455(a). The test for bias is not whether a public knowing bits and pieces of a situation might reasonably question ajudge's impartiality, but whether a reasonable public, knowing all the facts and circumstances, might
question a judge's impartiality. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing
the proper objective test to be applied to disqualification motions). This would require a reading of all of the relevant court materials, not simply newspaper headlines
and articles. See Panel Discussion, DisqualificationofJudges (The Sarokin Matter): Is It a
Threat To Judicial Independence, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 1063, 1088 (1993) ("[W]e do not
count column inches to decide whether judges have to be disqualified .... [and] [w]e
should not let judicial recusal motions turn on the happenstance of press attention.") (comments of Professor Stephen Gillers).
115 975 F.2d at 98 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). See supra
note 7 for the text of the Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution.
116 Id. at 98. The court proffered: "[t]o fulfill this [constitutional] requirementand to avoid both bias and the appearance of bias-this court has supervisory authority to order cases reassigned to another district courtjudge." Id. (citing Lewis v. Curtis,
671 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982)). The court quoted the
following from Lewis.
Impartiality and the appearance of impartiality in a judicial officer are
the sine qua non of the American legal system. In Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) ... the United
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The court stated that while there was no doubt that Judge
Sarokin was capable of presiding over the case impartially, it also
had to be determined whether there was an appearance of impartiality." 7 Because the ultimate issue to be decided by a jury was
whether the tobacco companies engaged in organized concealment of the possible hazards of smoking, the court found that the
comments of the districtjudge had destroyed the necessary appearance of impartiality.' 18 Consequenly, the court found that the appearance of impartiality could only be maintained if, pursuant to
the court's supervisory power, the case was reassigned to a different
district court judge. 119
The Hainesdecision is particularly confusing because the opinion contains no statutory analysis and relies solely on the court's
inherent supervisory power. 120 The court made no reference to
the disqualification provisions contained in the United States
Code, nor did the court cite a single case from any circuit construing §§ 144 and 455.121 The court's decision to rely exclusively on
its supervisory power is tenuous because it has been noted that the
supervisory power is normally reserved for areas where Congress
has not acted.

122

States Supreme Court stated: "Any tribunal permitted by law to try cases
and controversies not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even
the appearance of bias."
Id.(quoting Lewis, 671 F.2d at 789) (citations omitted).
117 Id.
118 Id. After stressing that the district court's comments went to the very heart of
the ultimate issue to be decided by ajury, the court noted: "[m]easured against these
precepts, it is impossible for us to vindicate the requirement of 'appearance of impartiality' in view of the statements made in the district court's prologue to its opinion."
Id.
119 Id.

See generally id.
The court relied almost exclusively on Lewis v.Curtis,where the court, "[w] ithout
pausing to consider whether there is a basis for legal disqualification," also reassigned
a case pursuant to the supervisory power. Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir.),
cert denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
122 United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983); United States v. Scop, 940
F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that supervisory powers are reserved for situations where no statute provides a rule, and "do not allow a court to 'disregard a rule
120
121

or statute ....'") (citation omitted).

The United States Supreme Court has declared that, for the supervisory powers
to be invoked, there must be "a judicial 'usurpation of power,'" where the district
court has clearly abused its discretion. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394,
402-03 (1976); see also Maryellen Fullerton, Exploring The Far Reaches Of Mandamus,49
BROOK. L. REv. 1131, 1142 (1983) (acknowledging that the Supreme Court has expanded the mandamus power somewhat but noting that, nevertheless, the power is
normally reserved for situations where district courts "have established a pattern of
erroneous procedures that are likely to recur").
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Aside from the separation of powers issue, the Haines opinion
is troubling because it appears to directly contradict the well- settled Third Circuit position on the extrajudicial limitation.1 23 Judge
Sarokin was making a determination regarding whether the crimefraud exception applied to certain documents. 124 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals did not address how the judge was to make
whether the tohis determination without addressing the issue of
25
bacco companies had engaged in concealment.1
A strong argument can seemingly be made that Judge
Sarokin's comments in the prologue to his opinion were "linked to
[the judge's] evaluation of the case," which is the standard set forth
in Johnson.126 Indeed, Judge Sarokin qualified his opening paraClearly, whetherJudge Sarokin's comments were extrajudicial or not is debatable
and it is thus hard to fathom howJudge Sarokin clearly abused his discretion in light
of the precedent established long ago in Johnson v. Trueblood, that disqualifying bias
must stem from an extrajudicial source. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 290-91
(3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981). If the Third Circuit felt that the
circuit's continued reliance on the extrajudicial limitation demonstrated a "pattern of
erroneous procedure" that warranted the extraordinary writ of mandamus, then it
should have articulated its rejection of the limitation clearly and unambiguously. Instead, Johnson remains on the books without any negative treatment as a vexatious
pitfall for lawyers and jurists. Id. Judges are left to guess at whether the Haines opinion represents, as it seems to suggest, an implicit rejection of the extrajudicial bias
limitation.
See also Brent D. Ward, Can the Federal Courts Keep Orderin Their Own House? Appellate Supervision Through Mandamus and Orders ofJudicialCouncils, 14 B.Y.U. L. Ruv. 233,
243 (1980). Ward points out that supervisory powers are usually reserved for "highly
improper judicial conduct which disrupts the efficient administration of justice." Id.
It is somewhat ironic that the powers are used to disqualify judges in the Third Circuit
in view of the fact that each disqualification arguably hinders judicial efficiency. See
infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text (discussing the massive administrative burdens that disqualifications place on the court system).
123 CompareJohnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
999 (1981) with Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992).
124 Haines, 975 F.2d at 87.
125 Id.
126 See Johnson, 629 F.2d at 291; Panel Discussion, supra note 114, at 1069 (arguing
that Judge Sarokin was making a judicial finding based on facts in the record and
declaring that "[a] judge's finding on the facts does not reflect an improper bias")
(comments of Judge Jack B. Weinstein). The Third Circuit, in Johnson, established
that "[t]he relevant inquiry [in determining if bias is judicial in nature] is whether the
trial judge's ...

comments were linked to his evaluation of the case... or whether the

comments were based on purely personal feelings towards the parties and the case."
Johnson, 629 F.2d at 291.
See generally Bennett L. Gershman, DisqualifyingJudgesfor Bias: The Sarokin Case,
208 N.Y.L.J., 1, 5 (1992) (declaring that "I have found no other case where a judge
has been disqualified for an appearance of bias for remarks contained in a judicial
opinion, based on facts in the record, and relating to the merits of the case ... one
comes away from this discussion with the impression either that Judge Sarokin's disqualification is an aberration based on undisclosed factors, or that the standards for
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graph by stating "as the following facts disclose," and then proceeded to list facts relevant to his determination.127 Regardless of
the forcefulness of Judge Sarokin's words, the judge's comments
were not a personal attack upon the tobacco companies, but ajudicial determination supported by facts produced at trial. 128 Moreover, the Johnson court explicitly declared that judges over the
course of a trial (or, in Johnson, before trial had even begun) are
entitled to form perceptions based on the evidence and the condetermined, is
duct of the parties. 129 Such bias, the Johnson court
130
judicial in nature and cannot be disqualifying.
Regardless of whether Judge Sarokin's comments created an
appearance of partiality or not, the most troubling aspect of the
Haines decision involves the issue of guidance: Which standard
shall Third Circuit district judges apply when faced with a close
future, the Haines
extrajudicial versus judicial bias situation in 1the
31
standard?
extrajudicial
Johnson
the
or
model
VI.

THE END OF THE LINE: THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES
WHETHER

§ 455 (A)

RECUSAL IS SUBJECT TO THE

EXTRAJUDICIAL SOURCE DOCTRINE

The debate that has raged for twenty years over § 455-resulting in a conflict not only among, but within, certain circuitsended recently when the United States Supreme Court decided
Liteky v. United States.'3 2 Liteky arose from two convictions for acts
of civil disobedience occurring nearly a decade apart. 1 33 The first
involved the 1983 conviction of Father Roy Bourgeois before District Judge J. Robert Elliot in the United States District Court for
disqualification based on a judge's 'appearance' are nebulous and confused."). Contra Panel Discussion, supra note 121, at 1078-84 (arguing thatJudge Sarokin was injudicious, and that the Judge's removal was necessary to uphold the appearance of
impartiality) (comments of Professor Monroe H. Freedman).
127 Haines, 975 F.2d at 97.
128 C.f, Blizard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d 1217, 1221 (1st Cir. 1979) ("If a concluding
paragraph using colorful language to drive home a point proves an entire opinion
biased, then few, if any judicial opinions pass muster under § 455(a).").
129 See Johnson, 629 F.2d at 291; see also In re Casco Bay Lines, Inc., 17 B.R. 946, 95354 (1st Cir. 1982) ("We know of no decision which states that a judge is prohibited
from forming preliminary legal conclusions based upon facts already in the record
which appear to be undisputed.").
130 Johnson, 629 F.2d at 291.
131 Compare Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992) (refusing to
apply the extrajudicial limitation to disqualification) with Johnson, 629 F.2d 287 (applying extrajudicial bias limitation to disqualification).
132 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994).
133 Marcia Coyle, High Court Hears CaseforJudge's Recusat NAT'L L.J., November 15,
1993, at 10.
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the Middle District of Georgia for several offenses, including assault, which occurred during a protest at Fort Benning Military
Reservation."3
The second involved another conviction of Bourgeois, as well as Charles andJohn Liteky, in 1991 for willfully injuring government property at the same fort, and was tried before the
3 5
same district court judge.1
Prior to trial, petitioners Bourgeois and Liteky moved, under
§ 455(a), to have the districtjudge removed from the case. 3 6 Petitioners alleged that Bourgeois's earlier conviction before the
judge, coupled with the judge's demeaning and confrontational attitude towards Bourgeois at the 1983 trial, mandated recusal in the
1991 trial.1 37 The judge denied the pretrial § 455(a) motion, noting that matters arising in a judicial proceeding could not be used
to disqualify under § 455(a). 38
At the end of the 1991 trial, Bourgeois renewed his § 455(a)
motion, citing conduct of the districtjudge in the 1991 trial similar
to that which occurred in the previous trial.' 39 Again, the motion
134 Respondent's Brief at 2-3, Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994) (No.
92-9621); Coyle, supra note 133, at 10.
135 Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1150-51; Respondent's Brief, supra note 134, at 2; Bourgeois's
second conviction was the result of a similar protest at Fort Benning; this time in
response to the training of Salvadoran soldiers at the Army School of the Americas,
located at Fort Benning. Coyle, supra note 133, at 10. During the protest on November 16, 1990, the first anniversary of the murder of six Jesuit priests and two others in
El Salvador, Bourgeois and the Litekys entered the Army School of the Americas and
spilled human blood on the exterior and interior of the School. Id.
136 Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1150.
137 Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1150-51. As evidence ofJudge Elliot's alleged "'impatience,
disregard for the defense and animosity' toward Bourgeois, Bourgeois' codefendants,
and their beliefs," petitioners pointed to the following words and actions by the judge
in the 1983 trial:
[S]tating at the outset of the trial that its purpose was to try a criminal
case and not to provide a political forum; observing after Bourgeois'
opening statement (which described the purpose of his protest) that
the statement ought to have been directed toward the anticipated evidentiary showing; limiting defense counsel's cross-examination; questioning witnesses; periodically cautioning defense counsel to confine his
questions to issues of material to trial; similarly admonishing witnesses
to keep answers responsive to actual questions directed to material issues; admonishing Bourgeois that closing argument was not a time for
.making a speech" in a "political forum"; and giving Bourgeois what
petitioners considered to be an excessive sentence .... and the one that
counsel for petitioners described at oral argument as the most serious
*

.

. the judge's interruption of the closing argument of one of Bour-

geois' codefendants, instructing him to cease the introduction of new
facts, and to restrict himself to discussion of evidence already presented.
Id. at 1151.
138 Id.
139 Id. Bourgeois specifically added as grounds for his renewed disqualification mo-
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was denied.14 ° After being convicted of the offense charged, petitioners appealed, claiming that Judge Elliot should have been disqualified under § 455(a). 14 1 The court of appeals affirmed, noting
that the alleged instances of bias were judicial in nature and could
not be the basis for recusal under § 455(a).14 2
Before the Supreme Court, petitioners argued that § 455(a)'s
language, because it does not contain the term "personal," coupled
with Congress's intent to "broaden" the grounds for disqualification, led to the conclusion that judicial bias could be disqualifying
under § 455(a).143 Respondent countered that Congress was well
aware of the extrajudicial bias limitation when it amended § 455(a)
and that its failure to even mention the limitation demonstrated
144
that the rule was meant to be retained.
The Supreme Court, while unanimous in its agreement that
Judge Elliot did not violate § 455(a) by refusing to disqualify himself, nevertheless divided sharply on the question of whether the
"extrajudicial source" doctrine applies to § 455(a) .145 A five justice
majority, perJustice Scalia, held that the "extrajudicial source" doctrine does apply to § 455(a).' 4 6 Justice Scalia began the Court's
opinion by tracing the history of the extrajudicial source doctrine
from its genesis in § 144.147
Justice Scalia first repudiated the popular belief that the Grinnell opinion's establishment of the "extrajudicial source" doctrine 148 was based upon the word "personal" contained in § 144.149
tion, the judge's "'admonishing him in front of the jury'" at opening statement and
the admonishing of his codefendants during the trial. Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 United States v. Liteky, 973 F.2d 910, 910 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
143 Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1153-54; Petitioner's Brief at 15-16, Liteky v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994)(No. 92-6921).
144 See, Respondent's Brief, supra note 134, at 26.
145 See generally, Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994). Justice Scalia, delivering the opinion of the Court, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
O'Connor, Justice Thomas, and Justice Ginsburg in declaring that the "extrajudicial
source" doctrine applies to § 455(a). Id. at 1157. Justice Kennedy,joined by Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to
express the belief that the "source" of bias should play no part in a § 455(a) analysis.
Id. at 1158 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
146 Id. at 1157.
147 Id. at 1152.
148 See supra note 25 and accompanying text discussing the establishment of the
extrajudicial source doctrine in United States v. GrinnelL
149 Id. at 1154. See supra note 12 for the text of § 144. The Justice demonstrated
that Grinnel's "extrajudicial source" holding was based upon a previous holding in
Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921), which, in turn, was based upon an even
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The Justice proffered several reasons for concluding that the correct rationale for Grinnell and the foundation for the "extrajudicial
source" doctrine was not the statutory term "personal."' 50
The first reason, the Justice proffered, was that because "bias"
and "prejudice" are pejorative terms describing judicial dispositions that are universally inappropriate or wrongful it is pointless to
divide the terms into an offensive "personal" variety and a nonoffensive "official" one.151 The second reason, according to Justice
Scalia, was that the creation of a complete dichotomy, when interpreting the word "personal," between judicially and extrajudicially
52
acquired bias would produce absurd results.'
In light of these reasons, Justice Scalia determined that the
proper origin of the "extrajudicial source" doctrine under § 144
and § 455(b) (1) "is simply the pejorative connotation of the words
'bias or prejudice,"' and not the fact that the sections contain the
word "personal."1 5 ' The Justice noted that not all unfavorable dispositions by a judge towards a case would necessarily be biased or
prejudiced ones: the only dispositions that are biased or
prejudiced are dispositions that are "wrongful or inappropriate."'54
earlier holding in Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., 230 U.S. 35 (1913). Liteky, 114 S.
Ct. at 1154. The American Steel Barrel Co. and Grinnell holdings, Justice Scalia noted,
did not rely upon the term "personal" in § 144, but instead relied upon the requirement that an affidavit for disqualification had to be filed 10 days before the start of
the court term. Id. That 10-day requirement, Justice Scalia proffered, was the reason
that the Berger court found that an affidavit "'must be based upon facts antedating the
trial, not those occurring during the trial.'" Id. (quoting Berger, 255 U.S. at 34). Thus,
Justice Scalia remarked, "[p ] etitioner's suggestion that we relied upon the word 'personal' in our Grinnell opinion is simply in error." Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. TheJustice opined that the explanation that the "extrajudicial source" doctrine is based upon the word "personal" found in § 144 "is simply not the semantic
success it pretends to be." Id. This is so, Justice Scalia demonstrated, because the
terms bias and prejudice are pejorative ones: they describe dispositions that are always
inappropriate. Id.
152 Id. As an example of a possible absurd result, Justice Scalia suggested the image
of ajudge presiding over an extremely long trial where the judge, having only learned
of an obscure religious sect at the trial, develops a strong hatred for the sect and for
all its participants. Id. Because this hatred arose totally from ajudicial source (i.e., it
would be "official" rather than "personal") there would exist no basis for the judge's
recusal no matter how passionate the judge's hatred for the participants became. Id.
153 Id. at 1155.
154 Id. For example, the Justice noted that even though there is universal hatred
for Adolf Hider, it would be incorrect to say that people are biased or prejudiced
against him. Id. According to the majority, it would be incorrect because the pejorative connotation of the words bias and prejudice require that a disposition or opinion
be "wrongful or inappropriate, either because it is undeserved, or because it rests
upon knowledge that the subject ought not to possess... or because it is excessive in
degree .... " Id.
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Having traced the origin of the extrajudicial source doctrine
for §§ 144 and 455(b) (1), Justice Scalia turned to the question of
whether the doctrine also applies to § 4 55(a). 5 The Justice
demonstrated that just as there exists a pejorative connotation to
the words "bias" and "prejudice" found in §§ 144 and 455(b), the
word "partiality," at issue in § 455 (a), enjoys an equivalent connotation, with equivalent consequences, i.e., the importation of the extrajudicial source doctrine. 5 6 Justice Scalia explained that as it is
necessary for any disposition to be considered biased or prejudiced
to be wrongful or inappropriate, all favoritism, to be "partial," must
also be wrongful or inappropriate. 57 Partiality, the Justice continued, like bias or prejudice, occurs only when the level of favoritism
has gone "beyond what is normal and acceptable."15
Moreover, Justice Scalia stressed, finding that the extrajudicial
source doctrine applies to §§ 144 and 455(b) (1) but not to
§ 455(a) would render the statute contradictory. 59 This is so because it would be unreasonable to interpret § 455(a) as eliminatThe same can be said for a judge. In certain instances a judge might look unfavorably upon a particular defendant. This unfavorable disposition towards the defendant would not be considered bias or prejudice, however, unless the judge's dislike
for the defendant was wrongful or inappropriate, i.e., unless the defendant did not
deserve to be looked upon unfavorably.
In view of the fact that it is the pejorative nature of the terms bias and prejudice
upon which the extrajudicial source doctrine rests and not upon the word personal,
Justice Scalia demonstrated that, in theory at least, disqualifying bias or prejudice may
stem from a judicial source. Id. This is so because while an extrajudicial source is a
common source for wrongful or inappropriate dispositions, it is not the only source
for them, and
[a] favorable or unfavorable predisposition can also deserve to be characterized as "bias" or "prejudice" because, even though it springs from
the facts adduced or the events occurring at trial, it is so extreme as to
display clear inability to render fair judgment.
Id.
The Justice cited this fact to explain why many courts have relied upon a "pervasive bias exception" to the doctrine. Id. (citation omitted); see supra note 27 for a
discussion of the pervasive bias exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine.
155 Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1155.
156 Id. at 1155-56.
157 Id. at 1156.
158 Id. at 1155. Justice Scalia further declared that:
[E]ven if the pejorative connotation of "partiality" were not enough to
import the "extrajudicial source" doctrine into § 455(a), the "reasonableness" limitation (recusal is required only if the judge's impartiality
"might reasonably be questioned") would have the same effect. To demand the sort of "child-like innocence" that elimination of the "extrajudicial source" limitation would require is not reasonable.
Id. at 1156.
159 Id.
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ing, implicitly, an explicit limitation contained in § 455(b). 160
Having determined that the extrajudicial source doctrine applies to § 455(a) as well as §§ 144 and 455(b)(1), Justice Scalia
made two final determinations.1 61 The first was that judicial rulings, by themselves, will almost never provide a sufficient basis for
bias or partiality motions. 16 2 The second was thatjudicial opinions
derived from current or past courtroom events will not provide a
sufficient basis for bias or partiality motions unless a deep-seated
antagonism or favoritism could be shown that would make fair
judgment impossible. 6
VII.

FACTORS IN SUPPORT OF MAINTAINING THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
LIMITATION

There are a number of reasons behind the extrajudicial limitation not mentioned by the Supreme Court which add support to its
continued usage: first and foremost is the desire to eliminate
'Judge-shopping. '""
Congress was acutely aware of this danger
when amending § 455 and explicitly provided that the general language of § 455 (a) was not meant to enable litigants to choose their
judge. 6 5 It was recently suggested that elimination of the extraju160 Id. To illustrate this point, Justice Scalia proffered that it would be wrong to
find a § 455(a) violation on the grounds that a party to a proceeding stood within the
fourth degree of relationship with the judge, because § 455(b) (5) specifically states
that only relations within the third degree are prohibited. Id. To hold, under
§ 455(a) that a relationship of the fourth degree is impermissible when § 455(b) (5)
explicitly provides otherwise would, according to the Justice, be an unacceptable elimination of an explicit § 455(b) (5) limitation. Thus, the Justice stated that:
when one of those aspects addressed in (b) is at issue, it is poor statutory
construction to interpret (a) as nullifying the limitations (b) provides,
except to the extent the text requires ....
What is at issue in the present case is an aspect of "partiality" already addressed in (b), personal bias or prejudice ....
[N]othing in
subsection (a) eliminates the longstanding limitation of (b) (1), that
"personal bias or prejudice" does not consist of a disposition that fails to
satisfy the "extrajudicial source" doctrine.
Id. at n.2.
161 Id. at 1157.
162 Id. (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966)).
163 Id.
164 See Bloom, supra note 5, at 664 (explaining that judge shopping occurs when
litigants "seek to disqualify one judge so the case will be heard by ajudge they believe
is more favorable to their side").
165 HoUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 5, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6355. Congress advised:
[I]n assessing the reasonableness of a challenge to his impartiality, each
judge must be alert to avoid the possibility that those who would question his impartiality are in fact seeking to avoid the consequences of his
expected adverse decision. Disqualification for lack of impartiality must
have a reasonablebasis. Nothing in this proposed legislation should be
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dicial limitation for bias would foster such abuses.1 6 6
A second concern is the massive administrative burden that
the federal system would be forced to bear if there was a significant
increase in either recusal motions or actual disqualifications.1 67 In
most instances, the disqualification of a district court judge means
that a new judge will be forced, in a short time, to become acquainted with facts acquired over years of litigation; facts that are
read to warrant the transformation of a litigant's fear that a judge may
decide a question against him into a "reasonable fear" that the judge
will not be impartial. Litigants ought not have to face a judge where
there is a reasonable question of impartiality, but they are not entitled
to judges of their own choice.
Id.; see Idaho v. Freeman, 478 F. Supp. 33, 36 (D. Idaho 1979) (stating that the test for
disqualification requires a balancing of the right of every litigant to have an impartial
judge against the policy of disallowing judge shopping); Blizard v. Fielding, 454 F.
Supp. 318, 321 (D. Mass. 1978) (declaring that the practice of judge shopping has
been universally condemned).
166 Panel Discussion, supra note 114, at 1119 ("Excessive concern over the appearance of impartiality is simply an invitation to gamesmanship, judge-shopping and satellite litigation, especially by parties who use hardball litigation tactics as a modus
operandi.") (comments of Professor Daniel J. Capra). As evidence of such "hardball
tactics," another panelist pointed to a statement made by J. Michael Jordan, counsel
to R.J. Reynolds tobacco company, where Mr. Jordan summarized the tobacco company's litigation tactics thusly:
[T] he aggressive posture we have taken regarding depositions and discovery in general continues to make these cases extremely burdensome
and expensive for plaintiff's lawyers, particularly sole practitioners. To
paraphrase General Patton, the way we won these cases was not by
spending all of [RJR]'s money, but by making the other son-of-a-bitch
spend all of his.
Id. at 1066 n.9 (quotation omitted) (comments of United States DistrictJudge Jack B.
Weinstein).
These comments suggest that the liberalization of § 455(a) standards to include
judicially acquired bias will most likely encourage companies who have the most
money to make § 455(a) motions based upon dubious "reasonably questionable" lack
of impartiality arguments as these companies will better be able to afford the protracted litigation that will no doubt result. Public confidence in the judicial process is
not increased where 'Judge-shopping" is afforded at all, let alone to predominantly
wealthy litigants.
A separate but related concern has been expressed that the elimination of the
extrajudicial bias limitation could encourage litigants to harass judges in an attempt
to make a judge lose his or her composure in a courtroom and use words that could
later be deemed disqualifying. Hoekema, supra note 5, at 715; see Wilks v. Israel, 627
F.2d 32, 37 (7th Cir. 1980) (determining that disqualification of the trial judge after
the defendant had assaulted the judge would encourage unruly behavior in the courtroom and disrupt judicial administration), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1086 (1981).
167 See Bloom, supra note 5, at 664. Bloom explained that an excessive amount of
successful disqualifications could have a serious effect upon judicial efficiency. Id.
Noting that judges are most often challenged long after litigation has begun, Bloom
suggested that the removal of a trial judge late into a trial results in considerable waste
of time and is extremely costly. Id.

2094

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:2057

often complex and extremely technical.1 68 Moreover, the very essence of a "trial" is compromised when the trial judge, who has
heard oral arguments and developed preliminary opinions, is suddenly removed from a case. 169 It is questionable whether public
confidence in the judiciary is actually increased where litigants are
forced, at trial level, to have their case decided by a judge who did
not partake in many of the "trial" functions.
Perhaps the most disturbing result of the abolishment of the
extrajudicial limitation would be the possible "chilling effect on judicial writing and decision making."17 Canon 1 (A) of the Code of
Judicial Conduct stresses the importance of an independentjudiciary. 171 Fear of removal has no place in an independent judiciary
and no judge should have to censor opinions based on facts
learned at trial for fear that a litigant may object to the forcefulness
with which the judge has crafted his or her opinion.1 72 As noted by
United States District Judge Jack B. Weinstein, the judiciary is best
served when judges issue clear, forceful, and unambiguous state168 Panel Discussion, supranote 114, at 1068-69 (comments of United States District
Judge Jack B. Weinstein).
169 Id. Judge Weinstein made the following comments about the importance of a
judge being personally exposed to the early stages of litigation:
Even a case in its early stage may have gone through extensive motion
practice, which gives the presiding judge a good opportunity to become
familiar with the facts and legal issues. By hearing competing versions
of the facts and competing arguments on the controlling law, a trial
judge gains an intangible feel for a case that is not available from reading a cold file. Lost are both time and subtle impressions of lawyers and
tactics that may provide the basis for more sensitive and productive
management of the case.
Id.
170 Id. at 1120 (comments of DanielJ. Capra).
171 ABA CODE OFJUDIcLka CONDUCr Canon 1 (A)

(1990) ("An independentand honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society.") (emphasis added).
The commentary to Canon 1, noting that "[d]eference to the judgements and
rulings of courts depends upon public confidence in the integrity and independence
ofjudges," provides that "[t ] he integrity and independence ofjudges depends in turn
upon their acting without fear or favor." Id.
172 As District Judge Sarokin explained when removing himself from a related tobacco case after his removal from Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc.:

The issue presented to me [in Haines] required that I determine
whether there was evidence of fraud and misrepresentation, and I made
that determination and found that there was. It is difficult for me to
understand how a finding based upon the evidence can have the appearance of partiality merely because it is expressed in strong terms ....
I fear for the independence of the judiciary if a powerful litigant can
cause the removal of a judge for speaking the truth based upon the
evidence, in forceful language that addresses the precise issues
presented for determination.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 466, 466 (D.N.J. 1992).
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ments regarding the matter at hand.17
CONCLUSION

The debate that has raged for over twenty years regarding the
application of the extrajudicial source doctrine to § 455(a) of the
United States Code has finally come to an end. In an articulate
and well-reasoned opinion, the United States Supreme Court
wisely determined that the extrajudicial source doctrine applies to
§ 455(a). The Court's twin assertions-that judicial rulings alone
174
will almost never provide a sufficient basis for partiality motions,
and that opinions formed on the basis of past or present courtroom events will also be insufficient unless a deep-seated antagonism or favoritism could be shown that would render fair
judgement impossible175-provide judges with powerful weapons
with which to defend themselves from meritless attacks upon their
integrity.
The various unfavorable consequences that would have followed the abolishment of the doctrine-such as judge-shopping,
waste ofjudicial resources, and stagnation ofjudicial creativity and
independence 1 7 6 -have been averted. Public confidence in the judicial system will increase and the system itself will benefit now that
judges can issue forceful opinions without fear of subsequent
removal.
ChristopherR Carton

173 See Panel Discussion, supra note 114, at 1070 ("No one should discourage clear
statements by judges in either a civil or criminal context. When ajudge admonishes a

defendant at sentencing or criticizes attorney's for misconduct, the parties and the
system are well served. It should be no different when private parties are involved.")
(comments of United States District Judge Jack B. Weinstein).
174

Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994).

175

Id.

See supra notes 164-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of factors, not
considered by the Liteky Court, supporting the retention of the extrajudicial source
doctrine.
176

